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STUDENT COMMENTS
ADJUDICATING THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF AN ASYLUM SEEKER: WHEN THE
“WELL-FOUNDED FEAR” STANDARD LEADS COURTS ASTRAY
Maritza Black*
This note discusses the standard that should be applied for asylum
seekers who are fleeing religious persecution in their home country. In order
to gain asylum in the United States, applicants must meet the standard of a
refugee, meaning that, among other things, they must demonstrate that they
have a well-founded fear of returning to their country of origin.1
Well-founded fear has been defined as when the applicant has a
“subjectively genuine and an objectively reasonable fear.”2 The subjective
fear is established when an applicant is found to have testified credibly
concerning their fear of return. The objective standard is more difficult to
define but has been likened to the reasonable person standard, when “a
reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution” upon return
to the native country.3 This standard is inconsistent with the way in which
other religious legal issues are typically addressed, and becomes impossible
to apply when an individual fears religious persecution such as black magic,
voodoo, or witchcraft that is incompatible with the Western perspective of a
reasonable fear. Evaluating another culture’s religious beliefs through the
lens of a reasonable person standard results in blanket discrimination
against non-Western ideologies.
The Supreme Court’s long-standing approach to determining an
individual’s religious beliefs is that it is only appropriate to determine the
sincerity of the belief, not the underlying veracity of the belief itself.4 The
same standard should be applied towards asylum seekers whose fear of
returning to their home country is rooted in their religious beliefs.
*
2019-2020 Executive Managing Editor, Concordia Law Review; J.D. 2020, Concordia
University School of Law.
1
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (2014).
2
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987); Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937
F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1991).
3
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987).
4
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situations of three Nigerian asylum seekers:
1. Adija learned that her husband belongs to the Ogboni, a secret society
believed to have supernatural powers. As part of his initiation he must
give up a family member chosen by the Ogboni to be the victim of
human sacrifice. The Ogboni have chosen Adija and she believes that
if she does not willingly allow herself to be sacrificed, the Ogboni
will kill her anyway. She is presenting her testimony before the
immigration judge, and when asked why she is afraid to return to
Nigeria she explains that her life is in danger there because the Ogboni
can kill her by merely touching her.
2. Adebisi fled Nigeria after his father was murdered, making him nextin-line to become the chief of the Esubete. He refused this role
because the inauguration process involved allowing the Esubete
elders to perform a religious ritual on him that will subject him to their
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control, giving them the power to kill him through the use of voodoo.
When the immigration judge asks if he went to the police, he explains
that he did not because he was cursed, and if he reported anything to
the police the curse would cause him to die.5
3. Edionseri sought refuge in the United States after he was ostracized
by his community in Nigeria due to his foul odor that led the
community to believe he was demonic. He believes that the odor is
caused by the demons that possess him. During his testimony, he
describes his troubled life: a wizard killed his father when he was a
teenager, the devil sent a wizard to transform him into a false prophet,
and he suffered an eye injury after a spirit threw glass into his eye.6
Although at first glance it appears that these applicants’ asylum
claims would be based on religious persecution, their claims would likely
instead fall under the category of membership in a particular social group,
because their fear is not that they will be persecuted on account of their
religious beliefs, but because of their social situations. For example, Adija
fears persecution because she belongs to a specific societal group family
members chosen by the Ogboni for sacrifice, not because of her religious
beliefs themselves.
Even though these asylum seekers are not claiming a fear of
persecution on account of their religion, the well-founded fear standard that
is used for adjudicating asylum claims will cause them to face issues of
religious discrimination during the adjudication of their asylum claims,
resulting in a high likelihood that their claims will be denied. The topic of
this note presents a potential remedy for this issue by presenting an alternative
to the current standard that mitigates the potential for religious
discrimination.
Under the current standard, the immigration judge will adjudicate
these claims by evaluating whether the asylum seekers’ fears are objectively
reasonable.7 This determination will then be used to decide whether they
must return to their home countries. Because this determination comes early
5

Hypothetical based on facts from Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying
asylum based on applicants failure to establish a well-founded fear of persecution).
6
Hypothetical based on facts from Edionseri v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir.
2017) (denying applicant’s claim to asylum because “the word ‘persecution’ in the governing
statute does not include harms inflicted by supernatural forces or beings”).
7
IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK, 785 (16TH ED. 2016).

194

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

in the adjudication process, it maintains a gatekeeping function that prevents
the judge from having to adjudicate the messier aspects of asylum claims,
such as the category or nexus elements of the claimed fear.
Ideally, in making the determination of whether a fear is objectively
reasonable the judge would look at a wealth of information, including
research on the cultural, social, and religious norms in the applicants’ home
country, to determine how a reasonable person in the applicants’ situation
would act. In reality, due to restraints on time and resources, the immigration
judge will likely make the decision based on the applicant’s testimony alone,
leaving a wake of uncertainty concerning what standard the judge is using to
determine what is considered to be an objectively reasonable fear.8
Why are immigration judges making decisions about the objective
reasonableness of an individual’s belief? The answer lies within the complex
history of asylum law, in a standard that was left unclear to allow the courts
to control the asylum process by creating their own tests.9 Although the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has attempted to clarify the issue by
establishing a specific, two-prong test, there remains confusion about the
manner in which this test should be applied.10
This note argues that the current approach adopted by the BIA
requiring immigration judges to analyze a person’s religious beliefs through
the lens of a reasonable person raises constitutional concerns and creates a
litany of problems such as inconsistencies between circuit courts and the
manifestation of cultural bias. Additionally, properly determining the test
presented in the objective prong of the current standard would require an
abundance of time and resources, which are already in short supply in
immigration court.
This note then presents a potential solution to these problems: the
adoption of the rule presented by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Ballard that prohibits the Court from making an inquiry into the veracity of
the individual’s religious belief, instead only permitting an inquiry into
whether or not the belief is sincerely held (hereinafter referred to as the
8
See, e.g., Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding the immigration judge
erred by not finding for applicant due to lack of evidence because the applicant’s credible
testimony alone is sufficient).
9
Craig B. Mousin, Standing with the Persecuted: Adjudicating Religious Asylum Claims
After the Enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2003 BYU L. REV.
541, 574 (2003).
10
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
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Ballard standard).11 The Ballard standard should be applied in place of the
objective reasonable person standard when an asylum seeker is claiming a
fear based on a religious belief.
Part I of this note will give a brief overview of the elements an
individual must show in order to be granted asylum, focusing on the history
of the well-founded fear standard. The current evidentiary standard in asylum
law will also be discussed to give context to how evaluating an applicant’s
credibility plays a key role in the asylum adjudication process. Part II will
present the current standard articulated by the BIA for determining whether
an individual’s fear is well-founded, look at the issues it has caused when
adjudicating asylum claims, and examine the constitutionality of this
standard. Part III will present the solution of adopting the Ballard standard
and explain how the proposed standard would remedy the issues raised by the
current standard and ensure that asylum seekers’ claims are evaluated in a
constitutional and consistent manner. Finally, this note will conclude by
exemplifying how the proposed standard would increase impartiality and
eliminate cultural bias when adjudicating asylum claims by applying the
proposed standards to the hypotheticals given above.
I.

SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES–EVIDENTIARY STANDARD AND
THE ELEMENT OF WELL-FOUNDED FEAR

When an applicant presents a case for asylum, the burden is on the
applicant to show that he or she meets the definition of a refugee, defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality….[and] who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. 12
This definition of a refugee is the backbone of all asylum claims.
Asylum applicants must show that they meet this definition before they can

11

322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944) (“[W]e conclude that the District Court ruled properly when it
withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or
doctrines of respondents.”).
12
8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2014).
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be granted asylum, regardless of whether they are applying for affirmative or
defensive asylum.13 The applicant also must be able to provide credible
testimony, because the testimony itself is often the only form of evidence
offered to the immigration judge.14 This is permitted due to the lower
evidentiary standard found in immigration courts because applicants seeking
asylum have fled their country of origin with little to no possessions and
cannot be expected to retrieve traditional forms of evidence such as medical
records, police reports, or witness testimony.15 The immigration judge’s
finding of an applicant’s credibility allows the judge to admit or deny the
applicant’s subjective perceived beliefs when adjudicating asylum claims.
In addition to providing the definition of a refugee, the Refugee Act
of 1980 also established a new procedure for granting asylum.16 One of the
primary goals of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring the United States into
compliance with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.17 Indeed, the refugee definition mirrors that of the United Nations
Protocol (but notably adds the language of well-founded fear).18 The Refugee
13

8 USC § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2008) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney
General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum . . . .”). This note will not
distinguish between affirmative and defense asylum because there is only a procedural
difference between the two. For an in-depth analysis on the difference between the two
processes, see Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 14, 2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states.
14
8 C.F.R. §208.13(a) (2019); see also Urgen v. Holder, 768 F.3d 269, 272–73 (2d Cir. 2014)
(reversing the BIA’s decision for failure to accept applicant’s testimony alone, instructing
that there is no requirement for additional non-testamentary evidence).
15
In re Barrera, 19 I&N Dec. 837, 845 (1989) (“The alien's own testimony may in some
cases be the only evidence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is believable,
consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis
for his fear.”).
16
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.). For an overview of the 1980 Refugee Act, see Arnold H. Leibowitz,
Global Refugee Problem: U.S. and World Response, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. AND SOC.
SCI. 163, 164 (1983) (“The act was significant in four respects: It established a federal policy
of continuing refugee admissions; it redefined the term ‘refugee’ to incorporate the
international U.N. Convention definition, it established the principle of asylum in U.S.
statutory law; and it established the principle of resettlement assistance for refugees.”).
17
See Edward M. Kennedy, The Refugee Act of 1980, 15 Int. Migration Rev. 141, 143
(1981).
18
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, Art. 1(2) (defining refugee as one who “owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
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Act also served to eliminate bias previously found in the asylum process by
removing the prior ideological and geographical limitations.19
Although the addition of a definition for refugees was one of the most
significant portions of the Refugee Act, the definition itself is vague,
impliedly to give greater leeway to immigration judges. This is because the
definition only determines who is eligible for asylum—the ultimate decision
to grant asylum lies with the Attorney General.20 The vagueness of the
definition allowed the courts to create their own definitions for the terms used
within the definition of a refugee, including well-founded fear, persecution,
and particular social group.21 This has created a number of inconsistencies
among the circuit courts that impact how asylum claims are adjudicated. For
example, the lack of a clear definition of persecution led the Ninth Circuit to
define persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm…in a way regarded
as offensive,”22 while the Seventh Circuit adopted a more stringent standard,
holding that “the behavior in question must threaten death, imprisonment, or
the infliction of substantial harm or suffering.”23 The disparity between the
courts contributes to the issue of forum shopping, where applicants physically
move in order to be in a more favorable jurisdiction.24
There also has been confusion due to the conflation of terms used in
the definition of a refugee and those used in withholding of removal. Thus, it
is important to note that this definition of a refugee only applies to asylees
and is not considered when seeking alternative means of relief such as
withholding of removal.25 For example, in 1984 the Supreme Court had to
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”).
19
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
20
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444–45 (1987) (“[A]lthough Congress could have
crafted a narrower definition, it chose to authorize the Attorney General to determine which,
if any, eligible refugees should be denied asylum.”).
21
Craig B. Mousin, Standing with the Persecuted: Adjudicating Religious Asylum Claims
After the Enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2003 BYU L. REV.
541, 574 (2003), see also Joni L. Andrioff, Proving the Existence of Persecution in Asylum
and Withholding Claims, 62 CHI. KENT L. REV. 107, 107 (1985).
22
Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969).
23
Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996).
24
See, e.g., Jason Ullman, Kadri v. Mukasey: A Legal Blueprint for Extending Asylum to
Homosexual Aliens Who Have Not Suffered Physical Persecution, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY:
REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 197, 207–208 (2009).
25
The primary different between asylum and withholding of removal is that asylum is a
discretionary form of relief while withholding of removal is mandatory. Additionally, there
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clarify that the well-founded fear standard in asylum is distinct from the
clear-probability standard found in withholding of removal, holding that
Congress intended the definition of refugee to be broader for withholding of
removal should be narrower because it is a mandatory form of relief.26
A.

Defining What Is a “Particular Social Group”

The area of particular social group, with which this note primarily
deals, is one of the most complex areas of asylum law. The term was first
defined by the BIA in Matter of Acosta as membership in a group that is based
on immutable characteristics; meaning characteristics that a person cannot, or
should not be require to, change.27 This definition was adopted by almost
every circuit.28 However, in 2008 the BIA added new requirements for
proving membership in a particular social group: the group must also be
“socially visible” and “particularly defined.”29 These terms were not given
clear definitions, but instead were explained with additional vague
restrictions: “particular” was defined as a group that was not “too
amorphous,” and one society would recognize as a “discrete class of
persons.”30 “Socially visible” was not explained beyond equating it to a group
that is generally “recognizable by others in the community.”31
The particular social group category tends be to utilized as catch-all
category for applicants that are fleeing persecution not encompassed by the
areas of race, religion, political opinion, or nationality. For example, the
asylum seekers from the above hypotheticals would seek asylum based on
membership in a particular social group because they are fleeing persecution
due to how they are perceived by others in their communities: Adiji from
those who believe she should be a human sacrifice, Adebesi from those who
believe he should be chief, and Edionseri from those who believe he is

is a one-year filing deadline in which most applicants must file for asylum within one year
of entering the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2019).
26
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425–30 (1984).
27
19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds.
28
See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (l0th Cir. 2005); Castellano-Chacon v.
INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546–48 (6th Cir. 2003); Mya Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir.
1998); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239–40
(3d Cir. 1993).
29
In re S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008); In re E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591, 594
(BIA 2008).
30
S-E-G-, 25 I&N Dec. at 584.
31
Id. at 586.
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possessed by demons. Although these claims appear to be based on religion,
it is important to distinguish that the religious beliefs relate to the applicants
fear, not necessarily to the reason they are being persecuted—the on account
of portion of the refugee definition. In order to determine the applicants’
eligibility, their fear will have to be evaluated using the well-founded fear
standard, meaning that the court will conduct an analysis on their religious
beliefs in the same manner that any other fear would be evaluated.
B.

The History of What is Considered to be a “Well-Founded Fear”

Similar to the lack of consistency between the circuit court’s
definitions of persecution and particular social group, there has also been an
inconsistent standard for what constitutes a “well-founded fear.”32 In 1987,
the Supreme Court recognized that “well-founded fear” was a vague term that
could “only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case
adjudication”, but refrained from describing how the well-founded fear test
should be applied.33 The Court did, however, mention a number of sources
available to guide the interpretation of a well-founded fear, such as the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (“The UNHCR
Handbook”).34 The UNHCR Handbook defines “well-founded fear” as when
an applicant can “establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in
his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in
the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned
there.”35 The Court also cites to several scholars who have weighed in on the
matter.36 Out of these scholars, there seems to be a focus on a real chance of
persecution, which predicts the objective prong later outlined by the BIA.37

32

See Mary McGee Light, The Well-Founded Fear Standard in Refugee Asylum: Will It Still
Provide Hope for the Oppressed, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 789, 791 (1997) (“[The well-founded
fear standard] is fraught with problems. The standard's vagueness is a source of conflict
between the INS and courts.”).
33
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
34
Id. at 468 n.22 (1987) (recognizing this source as useful; however, mentioning that the
source is not binding).
35
Ch. II B(2)(a) § 42.
36
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 468 n.24.
37
See, e.g., A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 181
(1966) (defining “well-founded fear” as when there is “a real chance that he will suffer
persecution”).
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Ultimately, the only decision from the Supreme Court that
specifically addressed the meaning of the well-founded fear standard was the
1987 decision INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, which rejected the BIA’s holding
that well-founded fear was essentially the same as a clear probability of
harm.38 In Cardoza-Fonseca the BIA had affirmed an immigration judge’s
holding that the respondent, a Nicaraguan citizen seeking asylum on account
of political opinion after her brother had been tortured and put into prison,
had failed to show a “clear probability” that she would be persecuted upon
returning to Nicaragua.39 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that distinguished between the clear probability standard and finding
that an applicant had a well-founded fear.40 However, like in INS v. Luz
Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court declined to provide a
definition for well-founded fear, instead leaving it up to the BIA to create a
new standard for how well-founded fear asylum claims should be
adjudicated.41
II.

THE CURRENT STANDARD – “WELL-FOUNDED FEAR” & RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION

After the Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the BIA’s interpretation
of well-founded fear, the BIA readdressed the issue in Matter of Mogharrabi
to determine whether an Iranian fleeing political persecution had a wellfounded fear of returning to his country after he was threatened by
government officials.42 The BIA once again attempted to reconcile the
incongruent standards used in the circuit courts and create a uniform test for
determining whether an applicant’s fear is well-founded.43 To do this, the
BIA adopted the well-founded fear test that was being used in the Fifth
Circuit.44 This is the standard that is still used today when an applicant is
38

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421 (rejecting the BIA’s holding in Matter of Acosta, 19
I&N Dec. 211, 229 that the “’clear probability standard’ and the well-founded fear standard’
are not meaningfully different and, in practical application, converge”).
39
Id. at 423–424.
40
Id. at 448.
41
Id. at 448–449 (“We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the ‘wellfounded fear’ test should be applied.”).
42
19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
43
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987).
44
Id. at 443–45 (“We agree with and adopt the general approach set forth by the Fifth Circuit;
that is, that an applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a
reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.”).
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claiming fear of future persecution.45
The BIA’s well-founded fear test consists of two prongs: the
subjective prong and the objective prong.46 The subjective prong presents the
easier test: it is met when an applicant testifies credibly that they are afraid.47
This prong is easily satisfied because the immigration judge has likely
already made a finding of the applicant’s credibility by the time this stage of
the asylum adjudication process is reached. Each immigration judge makes a
finding of credibility early on in the adjudication process in order to accept
or deny the applicant’s testimony as evidence.48
The objective prong presents a higher standard: the applicant must
show that “a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear
persecution.”49 Both prongs must be met in order for an applicant to be
granted asylum.50 It is worth noting that even though the second prong is
described by the Court as objective, in reality both prongs are highly
subjective determinations. In order for a judge to determine that an
applicant’s fear is reasonable, the judge must make a subjective
determination of what other people would fear, and whether that fear is
reasonable.
Even though the two-pronged well-founded fear test resolved the
issue of which standard should be applied, there remained confusion about
how the objective prong should be analyzed. The BIA expounded on this
issue in Matter of Barrera, two years after the well-founded fear standard
was adopted.51 In this case, the BIA recognized that there were disparate
approaches among the circuits regarding the objective prong of the well45

This test only applies when the applicant is claiming fear of future persecution but cannot
show past persecution, because past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future
persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i); see also Duarte de Guinac v. INA, 179 F.3d 1156,
1159 (9th Cir. 1999).
46
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987); Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937
F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1991).
47
Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 570–71 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Blanco-Comarribas v. INS,
830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987)).
48
See, e.g., In re A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106 (BIA 1998) (“[I]t is also well established that
because the Immigration Judge has the advantage of observing the alien as the alien testifies,
the Board accords deference to the Immigration Judge's findings concerning credibility and
credibility-related issues.”).
49
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987).
50
See, e.g., Jorgji v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that an applicant who
feared persecution after witnessing executions many years ago had a subjective but not an
objective basis for fear).
51
19 I&N Dec. 837, 845 (BIA 1989).

202

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

founded fear test, and reemphasized that the BIA was adopting the
“reasonable person standard” of the Fifth Circuit, describing it as a “common
sense framework” for evaluating an asylum seeker’s claims.52 The BIA also
specified that “a reasonable person may well fear persecution even where its
likelihood [of persecution] is significantly less than clearly probable.”53 As
stated in Moghrrabi, the “reasonable person” is a person in similar
circumstances to the applicant, and courts are encouraged to look at how other
applicants in the asylum seekers situations have been treated in their home
country.54
But how is an immigration judge to determine what a reasonable
person in the applicant’s position would fear? What evidence is permitted,
and who raises the evidence: the applicant or the prosecuting attorney? What
factors are taken in account when creating a theoretical reasonable person in
the same position of the applicant? Are issues of class, wealth, social status,
religious background, and personal beliefs considered? Is it a reasonable
person from the applicant’s home country or the exact town of origin? Or
could it be a reasonable American if the American were placed in the
applicant’s position?
There is little direct guidance on any of the ambiguity arising from
the reasonable person standard beyond the Supreme Court’s holding that as
little as a 10% chance of future persecution may be enough to create a
reasonable fear.55 The circuit courts have also failed to clarify these issues,
though some have tried to elaborate on how the standard should be applied.
The Second Circuit, for example, held that when evaluating the reasonable
person standard “the board should be sensitive to the position into which the
person is, hypothetically, being placed,” but failed to define what “being
sensitive” entails.56 The First Circuit followed precedent stating that the
52

Id. (“The meaning of the term well-founded fear has been the subject of considerable
controversy and litigation.”) (internal quotations omitted).
53
Id.
54
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. at 446 (“Where the country at issue in an asylum case has
a history of persecuting people in circumstances similar to the asylum applicant's, careful
consideration should be given to that fact in assessing the applicant's claims.”).
55
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (“There is simply no room in the
United Nations’ definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance
of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no well-founded fear of
the event happening.”) (internal quotations omitted).
56
Carcmamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2nd Cir. 1986) (“What is relevant is the fear a
reasonable person would have, keeping in mind the context of a reasonable person who is

2020

ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

203

objective prong must be “nestled on a plausible factual predicate.”57 Beyond
these scarce examples, there is an utter lack of clarification on how the
“reasonable person” should be interpreted. In an immigration court system
that is already fraught with procedural concerns, this ambiguity is worrisome.
The problems exacerbated by the ambiguity of the well-founded fear
standard are critical to address because they coincide with weak points in the
immigration court system. The discrepancy between courts, the lack of
sufficient time and resources, and judicial bias are all negatively affected by
the lack of a clear standard for adjudicating the well-founded fear element of
asylum claims.
Immigration courts present some of the most severe inconsistencies
between jurisdictions, with wide discrepancies occurring among immigration
courts and the immigration judges themselves.58 The discrepancies between
the courts can partially be attributed to the disparate rulings that are passed
down from circuit courts, which are binding for immigration judges.59 The
lack of uniformity in the asylum adjudication process contributes to the lack
of consistency across immigration courts. Deciding the objective prong of an
applicant’s well-founded fear is a good example of this: even cases with
similar fact patterns reach radically different results. Take, for example, the
issue of asylum seekers who have family members who stayed behind in the
applicant’s country of origin. In Hernandez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that
an asylum seeker fleeing El Salvador because he feared he would be
facing the possibility of persecution, perhaps including a loss of freedom or even, in some
cases, the loss of life.”).
57
Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Michel v. Mukasey, 287
Fed. Appx. 893 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Orelien v. Gonzalez to dismiss applicant’s fears of
being persecuted by former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s supporters as “unreasonable”
and therefore lacking well-founded fear).
58
See Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2013 2018, SYRACUSE
U.,https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2018/denialrates.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2020) (showing asylum grant rates varying from 1.2% to 92% depending on the location
and judge); see also Rosenburg et. al, They Fled Danger at Home to Make a High-Stakes Bet
on U.S. Immigration Courts , REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2017, 7:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-immigration-asylum-specialreport/special-report-they-fled-danger-for-a-highstakes-bet-on-u-s-immigration-courts-idUSKBN1CM1UG (“An immigrant’s chance of
being allowed to stay in the United States depends largely on who hears the case and where
it is heard.”).
59
Id. (“Immigration courts in California and the Pacific Northwest fall under the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, and they rule in favor of immigrants far more often than courts in
the 4th Circuit, which includes North and South Carolina, Maryland and Virginia, Reuters
found.”).
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assassinated by ex-guerillas for his military service had an objectively
reasonable fear even though his family remained safely in El Salvador.60
Three years later, in Garcia v. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit denied
an asylum seeker’s claim of well-founded fear based on death threats he
received for his work to “reintegrate youth from the guerilla forces into
society,” in part because “the fact that several members of Luis's family
continue to live in Colombia suggests that Luis's subjective fear of future
persecution is not objectively reasonable.”61
These cases highlight the inconsistent application of the well-founded
fear standard, because neither of these cases explains what information is
being used to determine what a reasonable person would fear.62 No discussion
is made of what a reasonable El Salvadoran veteran fleeing ex-guerillas or a
reasonable social worker from Colombia would fear, discussion that would
be of critical importance if the true reasonable person standard were
applied.63
Perhaps because of the inconsistencies in applying the objective
prong of the well-founded fear standard, many courts appear to ignore the
reasonable person language altogether. Instead, many courts have interpreted
the objective prong as a means of including outside evidence, such as the
Department of State Country Reports, in order to refute the applicant’s
testimony. In 2009 the Tenth Circuit Court found that a homosexual Brazilian
man had failed to demonstrate an objectively reasonable claim to asylum,
referring to a Ministry of Health report to refute the applicant’s claim on
grounds that “[t]he unvarnished fact that 180 homosexuals were killed in one
year is not remarkable in a country of over 180 million . . . .”64 The Eighth
Circuit Court also employed this approach in Reyes-Morales v. Gonzalez,
where the judge rejected the claim of an asylum seeker who was fleeing El
Salvador due to the civil war violence and tensions between the military and
guerillas.65 The case was rejected because the State Department Country
60

Hernandez v. INS, No. 00–70920.I & NS No. A72–174–709, 2002 WL 661712, *1 (9th
Cir. Apr. 22, 2002) (“The continuing safety of Hernandez's immediate family is irrelevant to
this case.”).
61
Garcia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 04–16396, 2005 WL 2141527, *1–7 (11th Cir. Sep. 7,
2005).
62
Hernandez, 2002 WL 661712, at *1 ; Garcia, 2005 WL 2141527, at *7.
63
See Hernandez, 2002 WL 661712, at *1 ; Garcia, 2005 WL 2141527, at *1.
64
Halmenschlager v. Holder, 331 Fed. Appx. 612, 616 (10th Cir. 2009).
65
435 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2006).
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Conditions report introduced evidence that the civil war in El Salvador had
abated, which, the court held, “provide[d] substantial record evidence to
demonstrate that he did not have an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution.”66
When courts reject an asylum claim based on the applicant’s failure
to meet the objective prong of the well-founded fear standard but fail to
analyze the applicant’s claim under the reasonable person standard, one can
only conclude that judges are determining what they themselves deem to be
reasonable.67 This is particularly worrisome because immigration judges
appear to be more heavily influenced by their individual biases, and the
history and design of immigration courts has created conditions in which
prejudice and bias seem to run rampant.68 Discrepancies between individual
judges have been attributed to personal characteristics such as gender, career
history, and the length of time spent serving as a judge.69 These discrepancies
can be mitigated through the implementation of consistent standards that
reduce the number of purely discretional decisions.
Immigration courts often receive criticism for overt and implicit
biases that appear more frequently than in other courts. For example, in
Benslimane v. Gonzalez, Judge Posner lists numerous cases in which the
Seventh Circuit sharply rebuked the immigration court for “inappropriate
66

Id.
Id.; Ossa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 656 Fed. Appx. 455, 457 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding that
applicant failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of persecution because she “failed
to show she could not avoid the persecution by relocating within Colombia”); Granados v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 578 Fed. Appx. 866 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying applicant’s claim based on
an inability to prove an objectively reasonable fear, but making no mention of the reasonable
person standard); but see Cardona Toro v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 371 Fed. Appx. 279, 283 (3d
Cir. 2010) (denying a claim based on a failure to show an objectively reasonable fear—“there
is substantial record evidence supporting the conclusion that a reasonable person in
Cardona's circumstances would not fear future persecution in Colombia”).
68
Jeffrey S. Chase, The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions, JEFFREY S. CHASE
OPINIONS / ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW (March 28, 2019), https://www.jeffreys
chase.com/blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi; see also TESS HELLGREN ET.
AL, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S JUDGES: HOW THE U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS BECAME A
DEPORTATION TOOL 10 (2019) (“Judicial bias is rampant within the immigration court
system, with immigration judges across the country failing to provide fair, neutral, and
consistent adjudication. Radical variations in case outcomes across the country demonstrate
that courts are failing to apply immigration law in an impartial and uniform way.”).
69
Rosenburg et al., supra note 59. (“The Reuters analysis also found that an immigration
judge’s particular characteristics and situation can affect outcomes. Men are more likely than
women to order deportation, as are judges who have worked as ICE prosecutors. The longer
a judge has been serving, the more likely that judge is to grant asylum.”).
67
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comments”; “the tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the
[immigration judge]”; and “hostile and extraordinarily abusive conduct”,
concluding that “the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level
has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”70 Reprimanding
immigration judges is certainly not limited to the Seventh Circuit. In one
Third Circuit court case Judge Fuentes remarked that:
Time and time again, we have cautioned immigration judges
against making intemperate or humiliating remarks during
immigration proceedings. Three times this year we have had
to admonish immigration judges who failed to treat the asylum
applicants in their court with the appropriate respect and
consideration.71
Finally, immigration judges’ ability to make informed decisions has
eroded under the pressure of the current administration to process cases as
quickly as possible. This pressure is further increased by the high number of
cases backlogging the court system and a decreased amount of time and
resources available to the judge when deciding a case.72 Efforts to remove the
backlog have resulted in the imposition of quotas on immigration judges,
forcing them to adjudicate hundreds of removal cases every year.73 Further,
budget limitations have left immigration judges without adequate resources
such as law clerks, of which there is currently only one available for
approximately every four immigration judges.74 This lack of time and
70

430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th
Cir. 2005); Qun Wang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005); Fiadjoe v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2005)).
71
Wang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
72
Nick Miroff et al., Burgeoning Court Backlog of More Than 850,000 Cases Undercuts
Trump Immigration Agenda, WASH. POST (May 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/immigration/burgeoning-court-backlog-of-more-than-850000-cases-undercuts-trumpimmigration-agenda/2019/05/01/09c0b84a-6b69-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html?
noredirect=on; see Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC Immigration,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2020) (noting
975,298 cases pending in 2019).
73
Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, As Immigration Court Quotas Go Into Effect, Many Call For
Reform, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Oct. 1, 2019), http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/10/01/
immigration-court-quotas-call-reform/# (“On October 1, immigration judges around the
country will arrive at work and face a daunting new task; complete 700 removal cases in the
next year or risk official sanction.”) [hereinafter Melnick].
74
Andrew R. Arthur, The Massive Increase in the Immigration Court Backlog, Its Causes,
and Solutions, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., July 2017, at 4.
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resources means that standards requiring intensive amounts of research and
consideration are ill-suited for immigration court. Reducing objective
standards that require careful consideration of outside circumstances, such as
what would be considered reasonable in a country with which the judge is
unfamiliar, and instead focusing specifically on the applicant’s situation
would make better use of the limited time judges have to decide asylum cases.
These issues in the immigration court system must be addressed
before asylum seekers can be guaranteed a trial before an impartial tribunal.75
The lack of guidelines for adjudicating asylum claims has further opened the
door for prejudice and bias in immigration courts, because ambiguity erodes
the necessary checks in place to curb discrimination by making it more
difficult to determine whether a judge was allowing his or her individual bias
to cloud the decision. Without a clear, consistent standard, the circuit courts
will continue to develop different standards for determining what is
reasonable, worsening the already severe inconsistencies between the
circuits.76 These inconsistencies between the courts are problematic because
they incentivize negative behavior such as forum shopping, and reduce the
chances of asylum seekers’ access to a fair trial.77
Allowing immigration judges to determine whether a fear is one that
a reasonable person would fear increases their already expansive discretion
with little guidance as to what the standard ought to be. Instead of giving
immigration judges more discretion, clearer guidelines should be established
so that there is a more consistent standard and a lower chance of abuse.
While Congress has taken steps to try to resolve these issues, in order
to be truly effective they must be addressed from an internal standpoint: by
75
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson, How
U.S. Immigration Judges Battle Their Own Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/us/us-immigration-judges-bias.html (“More than 250
federal immigration judges attended a mandatory anti-bias training session in August, and
this summer, the Justice Department announced that 28,000 more employees would go
through a similar exercise.”).
76
Even Immigration Judges have commented on the worrying inconsistencies between the
Circuit Courts. See, e.g., Dias-Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 17-14847, 2019 WL 1755642,
*17 (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2019) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“In my view, Ms. Diaz-Rivas’
statistics—showing that from 2014 through 2016 asylum applicants outside of Atlanta’s
immigration court were approximately 23 times more likely to succeed than asylum
applicants in Atlanta—are disquieting and merit further inquiry by the BIA.”).
77
For a greater discussion of the issues created by forum shopping, see Markus Petsche,
What's Wrong with Forum Shopping? An Attempt to Identify and Assess the Real Issues of a
Controversial Practice, 45 INT’L. LAW. 903, 1005–28 (2011).
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ensuring that there are consistent standards within asylum law that encourage
immigration judges to apply the law in a uniform, fair manner. Taking away
the objective reasonable person standard and instead adopting a consistent
standard for analyzing religious beliefs in asylum law would greatly improve
the discrepancy, bias, and inefficiency of immigration courts.
However, even if a consistent standard were to be developed—as the
BIA attempted to do in Matter of Mogharrabi—there remain constitutional
concerns in analyzing the reasonableness of an individual’s religious belief.
As discussed below, case law is clear that the judiciary is not the appropriate
forum for religious decisions, especially when the decision turns on the actual
beliefs of the individual.78 Allowing immigration judges to determine
whether an applicant’s fear that stems from his or her religious belief is
reasonable in essence allows the immigration judge to decide whether the
individual’s religious belief is true, an idea that is contrary to all other
religious-based decisions in the American court system.
III.

THE SOLUTION – THE STANDARD PRESENTED IN UNITED STATES V.
BALLARD SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN PLACE OF THE OBJECTIVE PRONG OF
THE “WELL-FOUNDED FEAR” TEST IN ORDER TO PROPERLY ADJUDICATE
ASYLUM CLAIMS

In 1944 the Supreme Court decided a keystone case for religious
freedom: United States v. Ballard.79 Although the subject matter of the case
was fairly mundane—the defendants were convicted of mail fraud after
distributing religious pamphlets—the holding from this case became one of
the most important tenets of constitutional law. In Ballard, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s instructions to the jury to determine only
whether the defendant’s beliefs were in “good faith,” and not to examine the
truth or validity of the beliefs themselves.80 Even though at first blush the
holding from Ballard appeared to be applicable in a very limited setting,
decades of case law following Ballard affirm and expand on this rule,

78

For additional scholarship concerning whether judges should have any authority to make
religious-based determinations, see Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Questions”
Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U.L.
REV. 497 (2005) [hereinafter Goldstein].
79
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
80
Id. at 88.
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creating what many scholars view as a broad ban on any inquiry into religious
doctrine.81
Part of the expansion of the Ballard standard includes a clear
prohibition on analyzing the centrality or importance of religious beliefs. In
Hernandez v. Commissioner, a 1989 tax law case concerning whether the
Church of Scientology should be allowed tax deductions for mandated
training sessions, the Supreme Court refused to analyze whether a belief was
central to the plaintiff’s religion, stating:
The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed
a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious
belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the burden. It is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants'
interpretations of those creeds.82
This generous interpretation of the Ballard standard was affirmed in
Employment Division v. Smith when the Court found it to be constitutionally
impermissible to make factual inquiries into religious doctrines or practices:
What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to
contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is
“central” to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of
different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable
“business of evaluating the relative merits of differing
religious claims” . . . Repeatedly and in many different
contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the
plausibility of a religious claim.83
The Ballard standard is not limited to cases that deal directly with
infringements on an individual’s ability to practice their religion. It has been
consistently applied across the legal system, including to administrative law
such as tax decisions where the Ballard standard has been referenced as a

81

See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 78.
Hernandez v. Comm’r., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
83
Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (citing United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
82
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guideline for the IRS when determining whether a deduction may be made
for various religious donations.84 It has been emphasized that no matter how
unconventional or bizarre, the court may not “deconstruct” an individual’s
belief system.85
The United States has clearly placed a high value on freedom of
religion, and considers freedom of religion to be a fundamental right86, so it
is not surprising that courts have gone to such great lengths to protect it.87
The Ballard standard promotes freedom of religion by shielding religious
practitioners from inappropriate judicial interference that would occur if
judges were permitted to analyze the substantive content of their beliefs.88
A.

The Application of the Ballard Standard in Immigration Court

Given that the Ballard standard has been generously interpreted and
is the bedrock for protecting freedom of religion, the question arises: Why is
it not being applied to asylum seekers? Although asylum seekers are not
entitled to the full range of constitutional rights as U.S. citizens, they are still
protected under the Freedom of Religion Clause of the Constitution.89
84

See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 693 (“Given that, under the First Amendment, the IRS
can reject otherwise valid claims of religious benefit only on the ground that a taxpayers'
alleged beliefs are not sincerely held, but not on the ground that such beliefs are inherently
irreligious . . .”) (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)).
85
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale, Inc., 311 F.Supp.2d 190, 191 (“While its tenets may be
viewed by some as unconventional, or even bizarre, the respect afforded by our laws to
individual conscience, particularly in regard to religious beliefs, puts any deconstruction of
the Church's doctrine beyond the purview of the court.”).
86
See, e.g., EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados,
30 F.Supp.2d 217, 225 (“Freedom to exercise one's religion lies at the core of our nation's
fundamental rights.”); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Freedom
of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men.”).
87
22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6481 (2000) (known as the “IFRA,” the International Religious
Freedom Act was enacted to promote freedom of religion on a global scale); see § 6401(a)(2)
(“Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human right and fundamental
freedom [. . .]”).
88
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (“But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged
with finding their truth or falsity…they enter a forbidden domain.”).
89
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). Constitutional restraints that limit what
the government can do rather than protect the rights of individual apply to citizens and
noncitizens alike.
The illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases challenging the statute
may claim the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause, which provides that
no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is a
person in any ordinary sense of that term.
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The issue arises when asylum seekers’ fear of returning to their
country of origin is grounded in a religious belief, and the judge, applying the
objective prong of the well-founded fear standard, must determine whether
the belief is objectively reasonable. This forces the judge to make a decision
about the validity of the individual’s belief, because a belief that is considered
to be absurd or implausible will not stand up in court as a reasonable fear. In
these situations, an alternative standard is needed so judges are not forced
into making a decision that is outside the scope of their jurisprudence.
When adjudicating asylum claims with a religious-based fear, the
application of the Ballard standard would prevent courts from inquiring into
the objectivity of an applicant’s religious belief. This is consistent with
precedent that the only determination courts should make regarding religious
beliefs is whether they are sincerely held. Therefore, if applicants can show
they truly fear returning to their home country, their fear should not be
dismissed as unreasonable, even if it is based on a supernatural power, belief,
or superstition.
B.

Difficulties That May Arise When Applying the Ballard Standard

Although it appears that this would dramatically lower the standard
for asylum claims, showing well-founded fear is only one of many elements
that an asylum seeker must prove in order to be granted asylum. Applicants
still have to show that they would be persecuted on account of their race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group.90 As
discussed below, lowering this standard would allow the court to spend more
time on the areas that are most critical—such as the reason the applicant is
being persecuted—instead of implementing a laborious, resource-intensive
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
90
As noted in In re Mogharrabi:
It must also be remembered that an alien who succeeds in establishing a
well-founded fear of persecution will not necessarily be granted asylum.
He must also show that the feared persecution would be on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. Thus, for example, aliens fearing retribution over purely
personal matters, or aliens fleeing general conditions of violence and
upheaval in their countries, would not qualify for asylum. Such persons
may have well-founded fears, but such fears would not be on account of
their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. Finally, an applicant for asylum must also show that he
merits the relief as a matter of discretion.
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 447 (BIA 1987) (internal citations omitted).
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standard to decide the objectivity of an applicant’s fear. Moreover, the
decision to grant asylum is ultimately one of discretion, so although the
Ballard standard would provide guidance and ensure the judge’s analysis is
in line with the Constitution, it would still be left to the judge’s discretion to
decide whether or not to grant asylum.91
Another argument against incorporating the Ballard standard is that
it would further complicate the already problematic process of adjudicating
religious asylum claims. Religious asylum claims pose a number of unique
difficulties that make them more challenging than other asylum claims
because of the limitations imposed on the court. Courts are restricted as to
what evidence can be considered when deciding how the sincerity of an
asylum seeker’s belief should be evaluated92 or how “orthodox” beliefs
should be determined when adjudicating religious persecution claims.93
Moreover, religious-based asylum claims tend to have even greater
disparities than non-religious claims, exemplified by author Carolyn Blum’s
finding that asylum seekers fleeing religious persecution from allied
countries of the United States are less likely to obtain asylum than those
fleeing religious persecution from countries that are considered enemies of
the United States.94 Religious claims, which are inherently subjective,
exemplify how bias can manifest in judicial decisions when the appropriate
checks and balances are lacking. Adding the inability to evaluate the
reasonableness of the asylum seeker’s belief would further complicate the

91

As noted in the Immigration and Nationality Act:
The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant
asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the
requirements and procedures established by the Secretary of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General under this section if the Secretary of
Homeland Security or the Attorney General determines that such alien is
a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A).
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
92
See Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the "Religious Imposter"
Problem: A Case Study of Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1179 (2010).
93
Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 726 (9th Cir. 1996) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
IJ's personal belief that Jehovah's Witnesses do not swear under oath was an improper reason
for doubting Mejia-Paiz's credibility.”).
94
Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values: Continuing Divergences Between U.S. and
International Refugee Norms, 15 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 38, 43–44 (1997).
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adjudicative process, a result that directly conflicts with the current
administration’s goal of resolving asylum claims as quickly as possible.95
C.

How Applying the Ballard Standard Would Improve the Asylum
Adjudication Process

Even though the application of the Ballard standard may present some
procedural concerns, the benefits of applying a standard that is consistent
with other bodies of law and promotes the freedom of religion outweighs any
potential negative impact. Applying the Ballard standard to asylum cases
would ensure due process compliance, increase consistency between courts,
enhance the efficiency and accuracy of the adjudication process, and ensure
the protection of the constitutional right to freedom of religion.
Although asylum seekers do not receive the same spectrum of rights
as United States citizens, they are entitled to a fair hearing. The 5th
Amendment entitles all people to the constitutional right of due process, both
citizens and noncitizens alike.96 If asylum seekers, whose very lives are on
95

Asylum claims were intended to be adjudicated in 180 days, but an increasing backlog
has slowed the process. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (1952)
(directing the Attorney General to set procedural guidelines so asylum claims can be
adjudicated in 180 days); see also Memorandum from EOIR Director James R. McHenry III,
Guidance Regarding the Adjudication of Asylum Applications Consistent With INA §
208(d)(5)(A)(iii) 1–2 (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1112581
/download (“[I]t is imperative that EOIR adopt sound strategies for handling asylum cases
in a timely manner consistent with the intent of the Immigration and Nationality Act”. . .
“[B]oth statutory provisions express Congress’s strong expectation that asylum applications
would be adjudicated within 180 days of filing.”). The goal of expediting proceedings has
become even more relevant under the current administration. See Memorandum from Tracy
Short, Principal Legal Advisor, Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding the Implementation
of the President’s Executive Orders and the Secretary’s Directives on Immigration
Enforcement 2 (Aug. 15, 2017) (“The efficient litigation of proceedings before the
Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is a key strategic
priority of DHS.”) (citing Memorandum from John Kelly, Secretary of Homeland Security,
Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements
Policies 6–7 (Feb. 20, 2017) (discussing the “unacceptable delay” in average processing
times before the immigration courts)).
96
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77–78 (1976) (Discussing the scope of the due process
clause which extends even to aliens who are not here legally. “[A]ll persons, aliens and
citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause . . . ”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”).
This Court's prior cases recognizing that illegal aliens are “persons”
protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which Clauses do not include the phrase “within its
jurisdiction,” cannot be distinguished on the asserted ground that persons
who have entered the country illegally are not “within the jurisdiction” of
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the line, do not have access to a fair and impartial hearing, they are not
receiving the due process to which they are entitled.97 A limitation on judicial
bias is critical for a fair trial that complies with the Due Process Clause. As
stated by the Supreme Court in In Re Murchison “A fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence
of actual bias in the trial of cases.”98 Given that uncurbed biases from the
immigration judges significantly hinder the opportunity for a fair trial, there
must be procedures in place to limit the effect of judicial bias. As Judge
Bownes explains in Davis v. Page, a case dealing with the ability for students
to leave the classroom when a classroom activity violated their religious
beliefs, “a judge must strive not to allow his decision to be influenced by his
personal appraisal of the claimed religious belief. Circumspection and
objectivity are a judicial prerequisite.”99
Applying the Ballard standard would provide this circumspection and
objectivity. Shifting the focus from the highly subjective criteria of
reasonableness to determinations that are more in line with objective criteria
would help mitigate the issue of judicial bias, and thus work to ensure that
asylum seekers’ due process rights are satisfied through access to an impartial
trial.
In addition to rectifying due process concerns, incorporating a clear
standard such as the Ballard standard would mitigate some of the confusion
surrounding the reasonable person standard derived from the objective prong
of the well-founded fear test. While at present judges seem unsure of what
constitutes a reasonable person, the Ballard standard would eliminate this
issue by redirecting the focus to the asylum seeker themselves. The clear
standard from Ballard ensures more consistent results. Especially when
dealing with religious beliefs that a judge may not be intimately familiar with,
a State even if they are present within its boundaries and subject to its laws.
Nor do the logic and history of the Fourteenth Amendment support such a
construction. Instead, use of the phrase “within its jurisdiction” confirms
the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection extends to
anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and
reaches into every corner of a State's territory.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982).
97
Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n alien who faces deportation is
entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence on his behalf.”).
98
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
99
385 F.Supp. 395, 402 (D.N.H. 1974).
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it is more likely that the judge can accurately determine whether an individual
is truly afraid than whether the fear is objectively reasonable, or one that a
reasonable person in the applicant’s situation would fear. This determination
of credibility is typically made in every asylum hearing, both to satisfy the
subjective prong of the well-founded fear test and to admit the individual’s
testimony under the lower standard of evidence.100 Determining whether an
applicant is sincere and honest is something that judges are accustomed to
and capable of accurately deciding. Because this determination is already
made, the Ballard standard would actually increase judicial efficiency by
streamlining the asylum process. It stands to reason that applicants who are
found to be credible are afraid when they say they are. Taking this assumption
at face value eliminates the need for an in-depth analysis of the
reasonableness of an applicant’s fear.
Applying the Ballard standard would not only increase efficiency but
also increase the chances that cases are accurately decided. Immigration
judges operate under impossibly high quotas, forcing them to devote
insufficient time to each case.101 The combination of a limited ability to
prepare and conduct the case, as well as the fact that immigration judges do
not have the requisite social, philosophical, and cultural backgrounds, makes
applying the true reasonable person test impossible. A true understanding of
what a reasonable person in the applicant’s situation would fear would
require hours of research and preparation, something that is logistically
impossible given the rate at which the judges must process cases. Allowing
judges to expand on a prior finding of credibility and reduce the number of
other requisite factual inquires would increase both the accuracy and the
efficiency of the adjudication process.
Most importantly, judges would not be forced into violating a
constitutional tenant by determining the reasonableness of an individual’s
belief.102 Evaluating the truthfulness of a religious belief has been termed a
100

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1952) (“The testimony of
the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant's burden without corroboration, but
only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant's testimony is credible . . .”).
101
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2019 UPDATE REPORT, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM 20 (2019) (“With a backlog of 768,257 cases (as of the end of FY 2018) this amounts
to approximately 1,851 backlog cases per immigration judge, an untenable level.”); see also
AILA POLICY BRIEF, RESTORING INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE TO AMERICA’S
IMMIGRATION COURTS (2018); Melnick, supra note 73.
102
As articulated in Judge Ferguson’s dissenting opinion in Meija-Paiz v. INS:
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forbidden domain for good reason. Allowing immigration judges to dismiss
an asylum claim based on their disbelief of an individual’s religion requires
a determination that a judge should never be permitted to make—the
determination that a religious belief is not “reasonable.”103 Even when the
reasonable person standard is properly applied, it fails to meet the
constitutional protections implemented by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Ballard. When dealing with questions of religion, courts are strictly
limited to analyzing the importance of the belief to the individual, and
forbidden from analyzing the veracity of the belief itself.104 If these holdings
applied in immigration court, the judges’ finding of credibility regarding the
applicant’s subjective claim of fear should be enough to satisfy the wellfounded fear standard without conducting an objective analysis by
adjudicating the reasonableness of the belief itself.
The United States has long prioritized the protection of rights over the
promotion of convenience, especially a right as significant as religious
freedom. Constitutional tenets ought to be considered even if doing so will
encumber the adjudication process, because the courts are the very bodies
charged with protecting these rights. Clear precedent that outlines how these
rights should be protected ought to be followed. In immigration court,
reforming the well-founded fear standard to comply with these guidelines
would not only promote the due process of asylum seekers, but also
streamline and improve the overall asylum adjudication process. Although a
standard has been developed over the years that attempts to take into account
cultural and situational norms, that standard is still fundamentally flawed in
that it requires the judge to make an unconstitutional determination.

A judge violates the First Amendment when he bases his decision not on
objective facts but on his personal conclusions as a ‘lay theologian.’
Whether a person is a devout member of his church is not for the
government to decide. It involves religious stereotyping that clouds all
rational thinking.
Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 1996) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
103
See, e.g., In re The Bible Speaks, 73 B.R. 848, 866 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)
(“[A]djudication of his claim would necessarily involve inquiry into the reasonableness of
those beliefs, an inquiry which the First Amendment forecloses.”) (citing Molko v. Holy
Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 179 Cal.App.3d 450 (1986)).
104
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“But if those doctrines are subject to
trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity…they enter a forbidden
domain.”).
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CONCLUSION – MOVING FORWARD & LOOKING BACK
In the event that the Ballard standard were implemented, limiting the
judicial inquiry into the objective prong of the well-founded fear test, would
the outcomes be different for any of the hypotheticals presented in the
introduction? Although impossible to say for certain, the answer is likely yes.
The Ballard standard would prevent these cases from being dismissed merely
because the judge was unfamiliar with, or biased against, these types of
unfamiliar religious beliefs.
Take, for example, the hypothetical of Adija, who believes that if she
returns to Nigeria she will be killed by the Ogboni. In court, she argues that
she cannot safely live anywhere in Nigeria, because no matter where she goes
the Ogboni will know where she is and how to find her. She explains that her
life will be in even greater danger now that she has told the court about the
Ogboni—merely mentioning their name is punishable by death. When asked
how the Ogboni will know that she has sought asylum in the United States
and revealed details of their practice, she says that they are using their powers
to watch her, right now, as she testifies.
From a Western perspective, or for anyone outside of this specific set
of religious beliefs, these beliefs would be dismissed as unreasonable.
Applying a vague standard of reasonableness would almost surely result in
the dismissal of her claim. Applying the slightly higher reasonable person
standard presents a number of practical difficulties. If Adija represents
herself, as most asylum applicants do,105 how will she convince the judge that
these beliefs are prevalent in her community? Even if represented by an
attorney who has the time and resources to prepare extensive academic
evidence documenting the existence of the Ogboni and the general prevalence
of fear towards them throughout Nigeria, will the judge have the opportunity
to thoroughly review this evidence and give it the weight it deserves? Should
immigration judges be making decisions on what a reasonable Nigerian
national may or may not fear?
These same issues are raised in the other two hypotheticals. In the
case of Adebisi, how is an immigration judge to know whether it was
reasonable for him to be afraid to go to the police without conducting hours
105

See Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas
for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 739 (2002) (“At the affirmative application stage, only
one in three applicants is aided by representation.”).

218

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

of research on the religious beliefs of the Esubete people? In cases that
challenge the very notion of what constitutes a religion, such as Edionseri’s
belief that he would be accused of being possessed by demons, the
immigration judge would have to try and figure out who would be a
reasonable person in Edionseri’s position. The idea that the immigration
judge would consider what a “reasonable person from Nigeria who is
believed to be possessed by demons” would fear seems outlandish, but this is
the very standard that ought to be applied under current case law. Of course,
because of the difficulty in applying the reasonable person test, the case law
has eroded over time to the broad standard of objective reasonableness, a
standard that requires great judicial discretion and thus brings inconsistent
results.
The application of the Ballard standard mitigates these issues. The
ability of the immigration judge to dismiss the case on the basis that Adija is
unreasonable is eliminated, focusing the analysis instead on Adija’s
subjective fear. Is she afraid? If so, then the case moves on to the many other
elements that she must prove in order to be granted asylum: she would
experience future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and her case
merits the judge’s discretionary approval. These claims are not easy to prove,
but the judge would be able to devote more time adjudicating these other,
truly objective standards with time that would otherwise be spent settling the
issue of well-founded fear.
In conclusion, the best way to resolve the current issues with
adjudicating a well-founded fear is to implement the Ballard standard so that
immigration judges are not evaluating the reasonableness of an asylum
seeker’s religious belief. Instead of dismissing religious beliefs as
unreasonable, immigration judges should instead focus on adjudicating
whether applicants for asylum are sincere in their beliefs. This approach is
consistent with precedent from the Supreme Court and the high value placed
on protecting freedom of religion.

